The Greenland Purchase That Wasn't (or The Artlessness of the Deal)

Introduction
Last month, President Trump made a seemingly impulsive decision to buy Greenland. He put out word of his intention which was met with a definitive, unequivocal and final message from Queen and Country of Denmark that “Greenland is open for business, not for sale!” That brief two-way volley was the extent and the death of those negotiations. The President’s approach lacked grace, finesse, and dare I say skill, and brought to mind images of a “bull in a china shop”.

Negotiation is seldom a quick event, but rather a journey with some twists and turns until the final destination is reached. A solid negotiation structure needs to be carefully constructed before a productive and optimal outcome can be ensured.

How then, might have these negotiations been approached differently in a way that would better have accomplished the interests of the United States?

Why Greenland
In early preparation for these negotiations, the first question that needed to be asked, understood and articulated is: “What specifically are the United States' interests in Greenland?”

Greenland lies within the Arctic Circle and is situated where the Atlantic Ocean and Arctic Sea meet. Due to climate changes and massive ice melts, new shipping routes have opened up between the Bering Straits and the Atlantic Ocean through the Arctic Sea. This gives both China and Russia quick and unfettered access between Eastern and Western hemispheres, of which both are taking advantage militarily and economically. Although the U.S does have the Thule air force base within one thousand miles of the region, a U.S. interest might be to have a stronger presence in the area where east meets west to help balance Chinese and Russian footprints and influences there.

A second important interest of the U.S in Greenland might be its rich supply of rare earth elements such as terbium, dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium and natural uranium. These rare earth elements are widely used in technology, military, electric cars and wind turbines.

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RISKS OF IMPOSING DEMANDS IN NEGOTIATIONS Lessons from Kashmir for our own Negotiations

Introduction
In recent news, Prime Minister Modi of India imposed direct rule over the Indian part of Kashmir, which for the past seven decades enjoyed semi-autonomous governance. It is unclear however, as to what prompted New Delhi to make this apparently unprovoked move towards Kashmir.

As a negotiation analyst, I would posit that this was a reaction to a perception that a solution to the Kashmir dispute would be imposed, if not for an immediate and decisive action on the part of New Delhi.

Allow me to explain:

The Etiology of India's Direct-Rule Decision
Last month when President Trump met with Pakistani Prime Minister, Imram Khan, he said; “If you would want me to mediate or arbitrate [the Kashmir dispute], I would be happy to do so”. This was after he claimed that he had been asked by Indian Prime Minister Modi to “mediate or arbitrate”.

This claim that Modi had invited Trump to mediate caused a major storm in the politics of India. Government officials strongly denied that Modi had ever requested or would ever request mediation from Trump.

India and Pakistan have resolved their differences through third-party mediation in the past. For example, in the Indus Rivers dispute over water distribution in the Indus system of rivers between India and Pakistan. This dispute resulted in the Indus Waters Agreement mediated by the World Bank and is still in effect today. Another example is the Rann Kutch boundary dispute between India and Pakistan, successfully mediated by British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. Why then, such vehement opposition on the part of India to mediate the Kashmir dispute.

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American Foreign Policy from a Negotiator's Perspective

Introduction
With the North Korean negotiations in retreat, the trade war with China raging, the Iran Deal unraveling, and the trade agreement with Mexico and Canada still not ratified, there seems to be a pattern of failed negotiations.

This pattern should compel us to ask “why?” and to carefully examine current American foreign policy negotiation and dispute resolution strategies.

A useful framework with which to begin this inquiry is to explore the three different approaches to negotiation and dispute resolution. They are: power- based; rights-based; and interest-based.

The Power-based Approach
The term “Power-based negotiation” is somewhat of an oxymoron, because when power is used in a negotiation environment, it is usually not used to negotiate a resolution, but rather to impose. The more powerful party imposes and enforces their demands on the weaker party, using threats, intimidation and force, often because they can.

A familiar example of using power as a negotiation tactic is the imposing of sanctions on North Korea to enforce America’s demand for total, irreversible and verifiable denuclearization. Another common example is military action.

Although there are certainly situations which call for a power-based approach, for example where there is an immediate existential threat, it should nevertheless be used with great caution and restraint in other situations. Often parties, when subjected to a power-based approach will be resistant, defensive, resentful, and will perceive themselves as being bullied. This approach, when used exclusively, very seldom produces the desired acquiescence.

The Rights-based Approach
Another approach to the resolving of disputes is a rights-based approach. One party believes he is in the right and the other party is in the wrong, or one party feels she is innocent while the other is to blame.

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Protecting Yourself Against a Nefarious Negotiator

Introduction
In Venezuela in recent months, the opposition led by Mr. Juan Guaido has been working assiduously to remove President Maduro from office. Many western countries, including the United States recognize Mr. Guaido as the legitimate leader of Venezuela while Russia and Cuba recognizes Mr. Maduro.

As part of this effort, and likely engineered by the United States, secret negotiations between the opposition and President Maduro’s inner circle were taking place to plot a coup to depose Maduro and to install Guaido. The premise was that this inner circle including top military leaders would support the coup.

A key figure in Maduro’s “inner circle” that was negotiating with the opposition was General Padrino Lopez, one of the most powerful men in the country with sweeping influence over the armed forces. The United States and the opposition firmly believed they he, among other powerful key figures, were strong supporters and negotiating partners with whom to work out a plan to overthrow Maduro

These talks produced a 15-point plan for a peaceful handover of power that would be implemented by the military. Under the deal, Mr. Maduro would be allowed a dignified exit from the country. In fact, Washington believed that these talks were so far advanced that an aircraft was already waiting on the runway at the Caracas international airport to fly Maduro to Cuba.

Then suddenly, without warning, this negotiated agreement collapsed and President Maduro remained in power with full support of his armed forces with no signs of any breach whatsoever.

It turns out that the apparent conspirators on the Maduro side led by General Lopez were in fact double agents with no intent to ever negotiate a coup with the opposition. They were nefariously mining for information to channel back to President Maduro to help him crush any attempt to overthrow him.

Although this example is borrowed from a political landscape, we face similar nefarious negotiators in our business negotiations too.

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Small Steps and Quantum Leaps in Negotiation

Introduction
A couple of weeks ago an item of news received little attention, being eclipsed by the release of the Mueller Report. Although perhaps not very significant in its own right, it provides an important opportunity for negotiation scholars and practitioners to analyze and learn from.

On March 22nd, 2019, President Trump reversed a decision by his Treasury Department to impose additional large-scale sanctions on North Korea. “I have today ordered the withdrawal of those additional sanctions!” tweeted the president without much further explanation.

A New York Times article on March 22nd stated: “[This Decision] created confusion at the highest levels of the federal government, just as the president’s aides were seeking to pressure North Korea into returning to negotiations over dismantling its nuclear weapons program”.

Cogent arguments were contended against the president’s decision. Some argued that the reversal of the Treasury Department’s decision conveyed a state of disarray in U.S policy – not an image that we wish to project to friends or foes. Others were concerned about not exerting a policy of maximum pressure on the North Korean regime, without which they are unlikely to unwind their nuclear weapon program. Another reservation expressed was that the reversal would tarnish and undermine the world’s opinion about American resolve.

Can an argument be made in favor of the president’s reversal of the Treasury Department’s “large-scale sanctions” decision?

Be Consistent in a Dispute Resolution Process
When embroiled in a dispute of any kind, careful and deliberate consideration needs to be given as to the appropriate process best suited to resolve that dispute. Is it to be negotiation or mediation? Or is it perhaps litigation or war? Is diplomacy more appropriate or would a campaign of threats, pressure and intimidation be more effective? (See also: Choosing the Appropriate Dispute Resolution Process).

Once an appropriate process has been decided upon, it is important to implement that particular process exclusively, without contaminating it with elements of other processes.

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