BACKGROUND
How it looked from the US perspective: A few weeks ago when the Ukrainian President fled the Ukraine and the opposition government seized power, Russian troops moved to take control of the Crimean Peninsula. The overarching issue was a tug-of-war between the European Union and Russia over the allegiance of the Ukraine, which led to extreme protesting and eventual civil war-like violence. Russia's move was immediately interpreted as an act of aggression with the intent to occupy the Ukraine much the same as they did in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (which was a reaction to economic reforms and decentralization of administrative authority taking place in Czechoslovakia at the time, under Alexander Dubcek. This was not well received by neighboring and virulently communist Russia, who had dominated Czechoslovakia since WWII). Russia's move into the Crimean Peninsula was even compared by some, to Hitler's taking of the Sudetenland in 1938.
These historical comparisons and relative assumptions are understandable, and to be sure, there do appear to be compelling parallels. Nevertheless, upon diligent examination and understanding of geo-political context and history of the relationship and disputes one sees that there is really no comparison at all. In fact, it is abundantly clear that Putin's motivations were neither the same as Brezhnev in Czechoslovakia in 1968 nor Hitler's with the Sudetenland in 1938 (an essay in its own right and beyond the scope of this column). Therefore acting upon these assumptions impulsively, without the necessary thought and analysis might be futile at best and dangerous at worst.
These historical comparisons and relative assumptions are understandable, and to be sure, there do appear to be compelling parallels. Nevertheless, upon diligent examination and understanding of geo-political context and history of the relationship and disputes one sees that there is really no comparison at all. In fact, it is abundantly clear that Putin's motivations were neither the same as Brezhnev in Czechoslovakia in 1968 nor Hitler's with the Sudetenland in 1938 (an essay in its own right and beyond the scope of this column). Therefore acting upon these assumptions impulsively, without the necessary thought and analysis might be futile at best and dangerous at worst.
